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Abstract  
The history of agricultural legislation from the New Deal to the present has been, in many
ways, a southern history.  Agricultural legislation contributed to the transformation of the land
tenure system in the South and to changes in regional cropping patterns.  During most of the past
65 years, southerners were in many key leadership positions in the Congress and on the
Agriculture Committees.  Yet, southern dominance of agricultural legislation is not apparent and
data indicates that the committees under southern leadership were generally evenhanded in the
distribution of government largess.  The prospects for a resurgence of southern control of the
agriculture committees, as in historic times, are not favorable.  
Introduction
In politics, as in history, empires rise and fall and rise again.  One such empire arose in the
Agriculture Committee  rooms of the United States Congress.  Its members were southern
3
Democrats who amassed power, not from conquest, but from longevity.  Through a convergence
of forces in the early 1930s, they were able to guide and implement sweeping agricultural
legislation which affected the way of life for 35 million people.  Through the Depression and the
war years, conventional wisdom suggests that southern Democrats controlled the agricultural
agenda.  Southern control waned during the Republican-controlled Congresses of the late-1940s
and mid-1950s; a resurgence occurred during the 1960s.  In the 1970s, under southern
stewardship, U.S. agriculture became orientated toward the world market.  Their legacy is
apparent in the transformation of the South from an ailing traditional cotton culture to a region of
thriving diversified agriculture.   
In the 1980s, it could be argued that the South’s dominance had eroded from an iron fist
to a tenuous grasp.  In the 1990s, in the new political arena, southern Democrats lost control of  For simplicity, we are defining the South as the states of the former Confederacy (Virginia, North
4
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee)
plus Oklahoma and Kentucky.  To accurately define the South as an agricultural region, West Texas should be
excised, and parts of Missouri and West Virginia should be added.   
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the agenda.  Still, the South is not dead; it has been transformed.  In 1997, in the 105th Congress,
there are more southern Republicans on the agriculture committees than southern Democrats. 
Arguably, the loss of power of the southern Democrats secured the freedom to farm provisions of
the 1996 farm bill.      
This manuscript is designed to analyze the substance of the control issue and its impacts
on the South.  In doing so, the paper will trace the extent of agriculture committee dominance by
the South through five political periods:
#  The New Deal Era: 1929-1946
#  The Republican Congresses: 1947-1954  
#  The Yellow Dog Dynasty: 1955-1974
#  The Turnover:  1975-1993
#  The New South: 1994-
In each of these sections, the makeup of the Congress will be analyzed, emphasizing the
composition of the agriculture committees.  This will be followed by a review of major policy
thrusts.  The concluding section will discuss implications for southern domination of the
agricultural committees in the future.
The New Deal Era: 1929-1946
Setting the Stage  
It is difficult for those of us who did not live through the period to visualize the changes
that have taken place in U.S. agriculture and the South  since the New Deal.  In 1929, most
4
southerners did not own the land they worked.  In the postbellum South, there was scarce capital
and abundant labor.  Large segments of both the black and white population were landless and
destitute.  With the elimination of the plantation system, a tenure system had developed based on
four classes: landowners, tenants, sharecroppers and laborers.  Tenants rented farmland from
landowners, sharecroppers used the resources of the landowner (housing, equipment, inputs and
land)  and shared in a portion of the crop (usually one-fourth to one-half), laborers worked for the
landowner for a wage (Daniel, 1981).  
In 1929, three crops were dominant in the South.  A cotton belt stretched from Virginia to
Texas with rice anchoring the west (Arkansas and the Gulf Coasts of Louisiana and Texas) and
tobacco anchoring the east (the Carolinas, Virginia, Georgia and Florida) (Daniel, 1984).  In3
terms of production, cotton was clearly dominant.  According to Kirby (1987), in 1930, more
than half of the approximately 1,200 counties of the South were committed to cotton.  
Farming was extremely labor intensive and labor was extremely abundant.  Since tobacco
required 257 man hours per acre to cultivate, tobacco patches were between three and six acres. 
A family could tend 10 to 20 cotton acres.  With mechanization, a rice farmer could tend several
hundred acres.  Outside the rice culture, mechanization was almost unheard of in the South.  For
most southerners, the tools of cultivation were the mule, the plow, the hoe and the hand (Daniel,
1984). 
Economic conditions were severely depressed in the South in the late-1920s.  After an
upsurge of demand during World War I, commodity prices and most importantly, cotton prices,
declined.  Already depleted soils were overcropped.  Outmigration occurred as southerners, many
of them landless African-Americans, journeyed to the northern cities in search of jobs.  Between
1915 and 1922, the boll weevil crossed the Mississippi River and marched to Virginia and North
Carolina, devastating cotton crops (Kirby, 1987).  In 1927, a Mississippi River flood covered 16.5
million acres and displaced a million people (Daniel, 1981).  The southern economy can best be
characterized in the late-1920s as being in a crisis situation.  With the onset of the Great
Depression, the crisis deepened.
Agricultural Policy in the 1920s
Since 1919, both houses of Congress had been controlled by the Republican party and
Republicans were in the White House since 1923.  The McNary-Haugen bill (named for the
sponsors, chairmen of the Senate and House Agriculture Committees, respectively) was first
introduced in 1924.  It proposed a two-price plan.  A “fair price” would be set in the United
States (through protective tariffs and a purchase program) with a government corporation selling
surplus production on the world market (Knutson, Penn and Flinchbaugh 1997).  Initially, the
McNary-Haugen bill did not gain the support of southern Democrats who were generally opposed
to protective tariffs and saw little benefit in the proposal, since the most of the primary southern
crop, cotton, was already exported.  The bill was finally passed in 1927 (with southern support)
but, was vetoed by President Coolidge.  McNary-Haugen was passed again in 1928, but was
vetoed once more (Coon, 1996).         
As the situation continued to deteriorate, the Republican Congress passed, and newly
elected President Hoover signed, the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, which created the
Federal Farm Board.  The Federal Farm Board was created to assist farmers in forming
cooperatives.  It also authorized the establishment of stabilization corporations to purchase
commodities and stabilize prices through a $500 million loan from the Treasury (Coon, 1996). 
The Act suffered from being passed right before the onset of the Great Depression and being
fundamentally flawed.  The loans were designed to be repaid by selling surplus commodities
during times of shortages, which, unfortunately, never developed (Knutson, Penn and
Flinchbaugh, 1997).       
As economic conditions deteriorated during the Hoover Administration, the Democratic
party made great gains in the House of Representatives.  Fifty three seats were gained during the
mid-term elections allowing the Democrats to gain control for the first time in twelve years, but
by only six seats.  With the landslide election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, the Democratic party4
trounced the Republicans, picking up an additional 99 seats in the House and 13 seats in the
Senate.  The victories in the Senate permitted a Democratic majority for the first time in 14 years.  
The South’s political position was both enhanced and diminished by the Democrats’
success.  Franklin Roosevelt owed his nomination and, ultimately, the White House to
southerners.  Yet, as Grantham (1988) relates, the South “...was suddenly changed by the partisan
realignment of the 1930s from a majority faction in a minority party to a minority faction in a
majority party.  The massive Democratic gains outside the South, which provided the foundation
for the Roosevelt coalition... drastically reduced the dependence of the national party on southern
voters...” (p. 102).  Ultimately, the South found itself in a unique position.  On many committees,
especially the agriculture committees, southerners had seniority.       
Until the reform-minded Congresses of the 1970s, committee chairmen amassed enormous
power solely on the basis of their length of service.  According to Cohn (1991), pre-1970s
committee chairmen have been called “petty barons” and “powers unto themselves.”  Their
committees have been called “little legislatures.”  At the same time, it would not be fair to fully
characterize agriculture committee chairmen in these terms.  Rieselbach (1995) indicates that
compared with the other congressional committees, the agricultural committees display a
“something for everything” attitude, trying to optimize benefits.  In other words, although
agricultural committee chairmen had greater power in the past than today, philosophically, the
agricultural committees tended to minimize confrontation in order to maximize benefits to their
constituencies. 
A New Deal for Agriculture
With the obvious failings of the Federal Farm Board, Congress continued to grapple with
agricultural policy.  Despite slim majorities in the House and Senate, several proposals were
debated and even passed during the lame-duck session of 1932.  Regardless, by early 1933,
Perkins (1969) indicates a consensus had developed among agricultural leaders that the proposed
“solution” to the agricultural crisis should include production control, a parity-price standard, a
processing tax, a basic-commodity concept (only the major commodities would be supported),
and the idea of using marketing agreements for a number of important purposes, including the
subsidization of exports.  Throughout the campaign and up to inauguration, Roosevelt’s
agricultural advisors increasingly embraced these ideas. 
Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4, 1933 and hastily called Congress into
special session to deal with the banking crisis.  Originally, it was intended that the session should
concentrate solely on that issue, but it was soon apparent that farm legislation should be
considered as well.  Roosevelt’s agricultural advisors quickly convened a meeting of national
agricultural kingpins on March 10 to discuss the farm crisis, possible solutions and the
administration’s proposal.  After garnering the support of the national leaders, a bill was drafted
by the administration and presented to Congress on March 16 (Perkins, 1969).
The Agricultural Committees immediately began hearings on the bill.  The haste in which
Congress considered the legislation is both a reflection of the gravity of the problem and the fact
that by mid-March, the spring planting season had already begun and, consequently, the
legislation would have to be enacted quickly in order to effect prices in 1933.  Both committees
initially held hearings on the bill.  The Senate concluded that with the bill’s processing tax
provisions, it was a revenue bill and deferred consideration until the House had acted.  By5
working through the weekend, the House committee reported the bill after only four days.  To
assure a swift passage, the rule for the bill permitted only four hours of debate and no
amendments from the floor.  After spirited debate, the legislation passed the House only six days
after its receipt by a vote of 315 to 98 (Perkins, 1969).   
The South’s impact on the legislation in the House is arguable.  John Nance Garner
(Dem.-Tex.) had been Speaker of the House in the 72nd Congress (1931-1933) before being
chosen as Roosevelt’s running mate.  He was ultimately elected vice-president, a position he
described as “not being worth a bucket of warm spit.”  Consequently, Henry Rainey (Dem.-Ill.), a
northerner, was Speaker in the 73nd Congress (1933-35).  In the House Agriculture Committee,
the Democrats as the majority party controlled 17 of the 25 seats with eight of those 17 seats held
by southerners (Table 1).  Furthermore, the South controlled all four subcommittee chairs and had
the top seven ranking members.  
Interestingly, Chairman Marvin Jones (Dem.-Tex.)  of the House Agriculture Committee
chose not to sponsor the bill, citing that it was not the solution to the perceived problems. 
Consequently, it was introduced by Hampton Flumer (Dem.-S.C.), the second ranking member of
the Agriculture Committee.  The committee made some changes to the legislation and Jones’
concerns were addressed in additional legislation (Perkins, 1969). 
Two days after the House passed the bill, the Senate held four days of continuous public
hearings.  Although the bill had considerable support, even its most ardent supporters did not fully
understand the complex legislation.  An additional two weeks of hearings in the Senate
Agriculture Committee followed as the committee grappled with its own disagreements and
attempted to write a report.  Chairman Ellison Smith (Dem.-S.C.) favored another bill, which he
had authored, and other members of the committee wished to insert or delete various provisions
(Perkins, 1969).  The Senate committee did not have the degree of southern dominance as the
House committee.  Of the 19 members of the committee, 12 were Democrats and only four were
southerners (Table 2).  Certainly, the influence of Majority Leader Joseph Robinson (Dem.-Ark.) 
was present.
To overcome the impasse, Roosevelt summoned the entire committee to the White House
on March 31.  The next day, Chairman Smith announced he would not introduce his personal bill
and the committee agreed to support the proposed legislation.  On April 5, the Committee
reported the bill to the full Senate with some useful amendments.  The full Senate took another
three weeks, with constructive debate, to pass the legislation by a vote of 64 to 20.  After the
differences were worked out in conference committee and passed by both bodies, the legislation
finally emerged as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  Passage of the bill had taken
approximately eight weeks (Perkins, 1969).           
Obviously, under the circumstances of its passage, the South’s ability to add to or detract
from the legislation was minimized, but the legislation certainly benefitted from southern support
and votes.  Furthermore, southerners were in key leadership positions.  Perhaps, southern
congressional support in general could best be evaluated with the general assessment of Breimyer
(1983); “...farm and congressional leaders were willing to gamble on an Agriculture Adjustment
Act of 1933 because they were scared” (p. 1155).       6
Table 1.  House Agriculture Committee Composition, 1927-1954.
Congress Number of Number of Number of Total Committee Number of Number of 
Members on the Majority Majority Members from Subcommittees Subcommittee
Committee Members Members from the South Chairs from the
the South South
70th 21 14 0 5 0 0
71th 20 14 1 5 0 0
72nd 23 13 10 10 0 0
73rd 25 17 8 8 4 4
74th 25 17 8 8 4 4
75th 25 17 8 8 9 7
76th 25 15 8 8 3 3
77th 25 15 11 12 3 2
78th 27 15 11 12 0 0
79th 28 16 14 15 4 3
80th 27 16 0 10 12 0
81st 27 17 10 10 9 7
82nd 30 17 12 13 6 6
83rd 30 16 2 14 7 0
Source: House Committee on Agriculture, Legislative Calendar, various editions.
Note: Republican-majority congresses are shaded.
Table 2.  Senate Agriculture Committee Composition, 1927-1954.
Congress Number of Number of Number of Total Committee Number of Number of 
Members on the Majority Majority Members from Subcommittees Subcommittee
Committee Members Members from the South Chairs from the
the South South
70th 17 9 0 6 No Record No Record
71th 18 11 0 5 N.R. N.R.
72nd 18 10 0 5 N.R. N.R.
73rd 19 12 4 4 N.R. N.R.
74th 19 13 5 5 N.R. N.R.
75th 19 14 6 6 N.R. N.R.
76th 20 14 6 6 N.R. N.R.
77th 20 14 7 7 N.R. N.R.
78th 20 12 7 7 N.R. N.R.
79th 20 11 8 8 N.R. N.R.
80th 13 7 0 5 N.R. N.R.
81st 13 8 5 5 N.R. N.R.
82nd 13 7 5 5 N.R. N.R.
83rd 15 8 0 6 N.R. N.R.
Source: Official Congressional Directory, various editions.
Note: Republican-majority congresses are shaded.7
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
The Hundred Days agricultural legislation which was passed by the Congress on May 12,
1933 was a watershed policy change.  In the 70 years since the passage of the Homestead and
Morrill Acts, U.S. agricultural policy had focussed on development and improvement of
agricultural resources (Paarlberg, 1983).  The 1933 Act, which was introduced as a temporary
emergency policy, ultimately would become the foundation of agricultural policy to the present
period.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was designed to restore farm prices to a parity
period of 1909-1914.  This was accomplished through the following mechanisms:
#  On “basic crops,” voluntary planting reductions were initiated through direct 
payments. 
#  Agricultural processors were taxed and the assessment was used to fund acreage 
reductions, market expansion activities, and surplus removal.  
# Voluntary marketing agreements were encouraged between producers, processors 
and distributors.  
# A nonrecourse loan was offered to corn and cotton farmers.
# Marketing quotas were initiated for cotton and tobacco through legislation passed 
in 1934 (Tweeten, 1977).
While one can argue the impact of southern representation in Congress on the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, the legislation would have a profound impact on the South.  Four of the
six program crops (cotton, corn, wheat, rice, peanuts and tobacco) were distinctively southern. 
Paarlberg (1983) indicates the preferential nature of the 1933 Act: 
# Approximately 100 other crops were excluded from the legislation.
# The six basic crops provided only 20 percent of agriculture’s income, but received 75 
percent of the program benefits.
# The top one percent of farmers received 21 percent of the benefits.  
Regardless, many (perhaps a majority), of the farmers receiving those benefits were southerners.
Cotton, Rice and Tobacco
By the time the 1933 Act was signed into law, most of the cotton and tobacco crops were
already planted.  The farm bill was designed to raise prices to a parity level (a base of the 1909-
1914 period) by reducing supply and paying farmers for acreage taken out of production. 8
However, most crops were already planted and farmers had planted larger acreages which made
achieving parity impossible (Daniel, 1984).  
In cotton, there was a carryover of 13 million bales and the 1933 crop was projected to be
17 million bales.  Expectations were for continued low prices (5.5 cents per pound in February,
1933) (Daniel, 1984).  Prices had averaged 35.2 cents per pound during World War I and the
1933 parity price was calculated at 12.7 cents per pound (Daniel, 1985).  The Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (AAA), an agency created to implement the agricultural policies,
immediately began efforts to cut production.  Payments, based on historic yields, were made to
farmers who plowed up between 25 percent and 50 percent of their growing crops.  An additional
option was provided for farmers to purchase surplus cotton at 6 cents per pound equal to the
amount taken out of production.  The AAA efforts resulted in over four million bales of the crop
being plowed under.  Prices increased to 10.2 cents per pound.  Interestingly, getting farmers to
plow under their crops was not as difficult as farmers getting their mules (who were trained to
walk between the crop rows) to plow under the crops (Perkins, 1969).       
In rice, overproduction was not a problem.  Many farmers had already exited the industry
due to the Depression or reduced production.  Regardless, rice was identified as a program crop. 
Due mainly to market forces, but bolstered by a marketing agreement by millers to pay the parity
price and charge standard fees for milling, prices rose from $1.55 per cwt in 1932 to $2.81 in
1933 (Daniel, 1984). 
Since the 1933 tobacco crop had already been planted and due to the many types and
differing markets for tobacco, the AAA deferred a reduction program until the 1934 tobacco crop
(Daniel, 1984).  With the expectations of a shorter crop in 1934, the AAA worked with buyers to
raise prices in 1933.  Still, prices for flue-cured tobacco hovered around 10 cents per pound,
much to the discontent of farmers.  Ultimately, a marketing agreement was worked out whereby
farmers pledged to reduce production by 30 percent in 1934 and buyers agreed to purchase
tobacco at a minimum parity price of 17 cents per pound (Perkins, 1969).          
Refining Farm Programs
The rationale of the 1933 Act was to raise farm prices to parity levels, an ambitious goal
which was never reached.  Regardless, the Supreme Court ruled the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 and its processing taxes unconstitutional in January 1936.  Since the elimination of the
adjustment program would have been more detrimental to farmers than the depression conditions,
Congress responded by passing the Soil Conservation Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 (SCDAA)
only eight weeks after the Supreme Court decision (Saloutos, 1982).  The SCDAA maintained the
basic features of the 1933 Act (nonrecourse loans and marketing agreements) and added three
new components:
# The promotion of soil conservation and improvement.
# The linkage of farm income, rather than prices, to a parity standard. 
# Food and fiber security through maintaining adequate stocks of agricultural 
commodities (Tweeten, 1977).9
The conservation provisions of SCDAA were created in response to catastrophic droughts
in 1934 and 1936.  This was another way of continuing the acreage reduction provisions of the
1933 Act.  Farmers were now being paid to plant soil-conserving crops rather than soil-depleting
crops, and most of the program crops were identified as being soil-depleting.  The loss of the
processing tax provisions was rectified by appropriating subsidies through the treasury (Coon,
1996).
With the unusually good crop production in 1937 and 1938, the limitations of the
conservation approach of the SCDAA were exposed.  Overproduction would have to be
controlled through storage.  With this in mind, agricultural policy was further refined through the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (Saloutos, 1982).  The Act incorporated the following new
provisions:
# Nonrecourse loans for corn, wheat and cotton at flexible support rates.
# Income parity payments to producers of corn, cotton, rice, tobacco and wheat.
# Maintenance of adequate reserves of agricultural commodities through the 
nonrecourse loan program.
# Establishment of a school lunch program, food stamp program and continuation of 
commodity distribution.
# Establishment of federal all-risk crop insurance (Tweeten, 1977).
The 1938 Act was unable to effectively control surplus production.  Actually, this was
beneficial for the United States as the country geared up for war.  During World War II, the main
intent of agricultural legislation was to encourage production for the war effort and the Allies. 
Legislation was passed during the war years which increased the levels of government support
and maintained that level of support until two years after the war (Tweeten, 1977).  
During the period 1934-1946, the South controlled many key positions in Congress. 
Democrats were the majority party in both the House and the Senate.  With the death of Speaker
Rainey (Dem.-Ill.) in 1934, a succession of southerners would control the Speaker’s gavel in the
House.  These gentlemen were: Joseph Byrns (Dem.-Tenn.), 1934-1935; William Bankhead
(Dem.-Ala.), 1936-1940; and Sam Rayburn (Dem.-Tex.), 1940 to 1946.       
Likewise, southerners were in key leadership positions of the House Agriculture
Committee.  Marvin Jones (Dem.-Tex.) continued as chair during this period until he was
succeeded by Hampton Fulmer (Dem.-S.C.), late-1940-1944; who was then succeeded by John
W. Flannagan (Dem.-Va.), 1945-1946.  Southerners also controlled the subcommittee chairs.  In
the 74th Congress, which produced the 1936 Act, southerners were chairmen of all four
subcommittees (Table 1).  In the 75th Congress, which produced the 1938 Act, southerners were
chairmen of the four main subcommittees and three of the five special commodity subcommittees. 
Throughout the remainder of this period, southern dominance of the subcommittees continued.  
Furthermore, the number of southern Democrats on the House Agriculture Committee
increased during this period.  In the 74th Congress (1935-1937) of the 17 majority members (25  This is a lesson from 1933 which could have been applied to the lump-sum payments under the 1996
5
farm bill.  Landlords are perhaps as dominant today as they were in the 1930s.
  It should, however, be clear that mechanization would have occurred regardless of the lucrative farm
6
bill provisions.  Attributing mechanization to farm policy would be a serious mistake.
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total members), eight were southern Democrats (Table 1).  In the 79th Congress (1945-1947) of
the 16 majority members (28 total members), 14 were southern Democrats. 
In the Senate, Joseph Robinson (Dem.-Ark.), 1933-1937, continued as Majority Leader
until succeeded by Alben Barkley (Dem.-Ky.), 1937-1947.  Likewise, Ellison Smith (Dem.-S.C.)
continued as chair until his death in 1944.  He was replaced by Elmer Thomas (Dem.-Okla.),
1944-1947.   
In the Senate, the number of southern Democrats increased on the Agriculture Committee
during the period.  In the 74th Congress (1935-1937) of the 13 majority members (19 total
members), five were southern Democrats (Table 2).  In the 79th Congress (1945-1947) of the 11
majority members (20 total members), eight were southern Democrats.     
The Republican Congresses: 1947-1954
Winners and Losers
By 1947, significant events had occurred in southern agriculture.  Recall that in the post-
Civil War/Reconstruction South, a land tenure system had developed based on landowners,
tenants, sharecroppers, and laborers.  The New Deal farm programs, which were designed to raise
farm prices and reduce production, were also swiftly dismantling and transforming what Daniel
(1981) called “an almost feudal agricultural system” (p. 231).    
The origin of the transformation can be traced to the 1933 plowup.  The first effect of the
plowup was to reduce the demand for harvest labor.  Secondly and more importantly, although
the 1933 farm legislation indicated that government payments should be divided between
landlords and tenants, there was little mechanism to ensure this.  Although checks were to be
written separately to landlords and tenants, with the indebtedness inherent in the system, there
was ample opportunity for abuse (Perkins, 1969).  Conrad (1965) indicates that, “A tenant was
lucky if he received any cash from the 1933 plowup” (p. 66).  
Although many landlords followed the intent of the legislation, an unprecedented eviction
of sharecroppers and tenants had begun.  Some were temporarily hired as laborers during crop
harvesting.  The remainder were dispossessed and migrated to urban areas. Certainly, this was not
the intent of the farm legislation  (it was to reduce production and raise prices), but with the local
5
AAA boards dominated by landlords and an essentially indifferent USDA, there was little recourse
for exploited tenants and sharecroppers (Kirby, 1987 and Daniel, 1981).  
Equally as threatened as the sharecropper was the mule.  Landowners were able to use the
government payments to mechanize.  Tractors and harvesters gradually replaced mules and human
hands.   Daniel (1984) indicates, “One case from Black Belt Georgia revealed that a planter who
6
customarily ran ten tenant families and twelve mules bought a tractor and equipment and
‘displaced all 10 cropper families and sold 8 of his mules’” (p.  446).  Additionally, with11
landowners’ incomes raised to near parity levels, they were able to consolidate and expand their
land holdings.  This began a trend of declining farm numbers which has continued to this day.    
Government research funding in the 1940s led to the expanded development of
agricultural chemicals.  With herbicides, crops no longer had to be manually weeded.  Chemical
fertilizers and improved varieties of seeds improved yields.  By the mid-1950s, the age of large-
scale hired labor in the South was over (Kirby, 1987).  
The production systems of the South were also being transformed.  In 1930, half of the
counties of the South were cotton dependent.  Kirby (1987) indicates that “By 1959, there were
only 11 counties in four southern states where cotton amounted to more than 50 percent of crops
harvested” (p. 53).  Besides cotton, rice and tobacco, southern farmers were planting peanuts,
grain sorghum, corn, soybeans and wheat.  Dairy and beef cattle operations were increasing. 
Southern agriculture was diversifying.    
Policy in Transition
By having seniority in the Democratic party, the South rose to dominate many key
political positions from 1932 to 1946.  In the 1946 mid-term elections, Republicans gained control
of both Houses of Congress.  The South, with all of its bets placed with the Democratic party,
found itself in the minority.    
Through the Steagall Amendment of 1941, government support for agriculture remained
at wartime levels until two years after hostilities officially ceased (December 31, 1946) to ensure
agriculture a smoother transition into the post-war economy.  Consequently, a new farm bill for
the post-war period would be necessary in 1949.  With this in mind, USDA, Congress and the
land-grant university system each organized committees to study agricultural problems and
policies (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976).        
Throughout the New Deal era, agricultural policy had achieved a sense of bipartisianism.
By 1948, two major viewpoints had emerged for future policy direction.  Favoring a flexible price
support approach were farm organizations, the Truman administration, and many Republican
congressmen.  Southern Democrats were generally opposed to this approach.  They considered
the problem to be one of excess capacity and favored high price supports with restrictions on
output.  As a compromise, the Agriculture Act of 1948 was passed.  It continued the high price
supports for one year, after which flexible price supports would be implemented (Cochrane and
Ryan, 1976).
The Democrats regained the majority in the 81st Congress (1949-1951).  The agricultural
committee chairmen expressed their dissatisfaction with the flexible price support provisions of
the 1948 Act (which were due to be enacted in 1950) by requesting a new program from USDA. 
The Brannan Plan, named after the then secretary of agriculture, emerged in 1949.  It was an
innovative proposal advocating market clearing prices with income-supporting supplemental
payments to farmers.  Ultimately, the Brannan Plan was not enacted.  Congress passed the  The 1949 Act, along with the 1938 Act, the CCC Charter Act of 1948 and the 1954 Act (P.L. 480) are
7
all considered “permanent legislation.”  Since subsequent farm bills have all had deadlines and merely amend
provisions of previous legislation, if a new bill is not enacted before the expiration of the previous one, the
permanent provisions come into effect.  The antiquated provisions of the permanent legislation have compelled
Congress to act before the deadline.  The 1996 farm bill, up to the conference committee action, was to be made
permanent legislation replacing the 1949 Act et al.    
12
Agriculture Act of 1949  which modified the 1948 Act, but maintained the means of supporting
7
prices (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976).        
The Democrats maintained control in the 82nd Congress (1951-1953), but narrowly lost
the majority to the Republicans in the 83rd (1953-1955).  After the end of the Korean War,
agricultural surpluses began to mount.  The Republican-controlled Congress responded to the
surplus problem on two fronts.  First, the Food for Peace legislation, P.L.480, was passed in
1954.  P.L.480 sought to reduce surplus production through concessional sales and donations to
needy countries.  Second was the passage of the Agriculture Act of 1954.  Flexible price supports
were enacted for the basic commodities.  Secretary Benson was given the discretion to set the
loan rate between 82.5 to 90 percent of parity in 1955 and 75 to 90 percent thereafter (Tweeten,
1977).  
The 1954 Act is notable for two major reasons:
# The flexible price support debate on the degree of government intervention in 
agriculture had endured since World War II, when Congress had set price supports at 
fixed higher levels (90 percent or more of parity).  The southern Democrats fought
hard to prevent the enactment of flexible price supports (more market orientation and
less government involvement) and lost.    
# For the first time, all major program crops were treated together in a general program 
context.  Previously, each commodity had its own program in which adjustments in
one commodity would interfere with another (Knutson, Penn and Flinchbaugh, 1997).  
In cotton, individual legislation addressed the surplus problem.  Harvested acreage in 1953
had increased to 24.3 million acres.  Under the existing allotments and marketing quotas, the
secretary of agriculture was required to announce a national allotment of 17 million acres in 1954. 
Through congressional action, the national allotment was increased from 70 to 80 percent of the
1952 production base.  Interestingly, even though the southern Democrats were not in the
majority, their presence was still felt.  Most of the additional acreage had arisen in the western
states and not in the traditional cotton belt.  The allotment was allocated disproportionately
among the states.  While the allotments for Alabama and Mississippi were set at 87 percent of the
1952 production, California and Arizona allotments were set at 67 percent.  The allotment for
Texas was 74 percent.  With only one westerner on the House committee and none on the Senate
committee, the result was predictable (Field, 1968).13
Assessment: 1947-1954
     
Political turnovers revealed both the strength and weakness of the solid South.  During
this period, the speakership of the House was traded between Joseph Martin (Rep.-Mass.) and
Sam Rayburn (Dem.-Tex.).  Likewise, the chair of the House Agriculture Committee was passed
between Clifford Hope (Rep.-Kans.) and Harold Cooley (Dem.-N.C.).  Southerners were
subcommittee chairmen of seven of the nine subcommittees in the 81st Congress (1949-1951) and
all six of the subcommittees in the 82nd Congress (1951-1953) (Table 1).  During the 80th (1947-
1949) and 83rd (1953-1955) Congresses, subcommittee chairs passed to Republican members
from the Midwest.
In the Senate, Alben Barkley became Truman’s vice president in 1949.  Throughout the
remainder of this period, a southerner would not be majority leader of the Senate.  Chairmen of
the Senate Agriculture Committee during this time were: Arthur Capper (Rep.-Kans.), 1947-
1949; Elmer Thomas (Dem.-Okla.), 1949-1951; Allen Ellender (Dem.- La.), 1951-1953; and
George Aiken (Rep.-Vt.), 1953-1955.               
The years 1947-1954 were a transition era for agriculture, both politically and
technologically.  Agricultural policy, which had been envisioned as an emergency measure during
the Depression and a strategic concern during World War II, was now seen as a routine function
of government.  Agriculture was in rapid transition as an institution, both technologically and
socially.  Most importantly, although they ultimately lost the battle on flexible price supports,
southern Democrats emerged during this period as a political and directional force in agricultural
legislation.      
   
The Yellow Dog Dynasty:  1955-1974
From Flexible Price Supports to Market Orientation
In 1955, when the Democratic Party regained control of Congress, the leaders of the
agricultural committees resumed the running battle over the level of price supports.  In 1955 and
1956, the Congress passed legislation to reinstate high and fixed price supports favored by
southern Democrats.  Both measures were vetoed by Eisenhower (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976). 
The legislation which emerged from this session, the Agricultural Act of 1956, did not address the
price support issue for program crops.  It established the Soil Bank which reduced acreage to
control production (Tweeten, 1977).    
Debate on the direction of agricultural policy continued into the 1960s as surpluses
continued to build.  Willard Cochrane and Secretary Freeman convinced President Kennedy that
the farm problem was one of chronic surpluses and with highly inelastic supply and demand
schedules, the price and income problem could be solved with mandatory production controls. 
Kennedy outlined his farm policy goals in a special message to Congress in 1961 (Cochrane and
Ryan, 1976).      
After several failed attempts, an omnibus Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 was passed. 
It expanded domestic and international food aid and offered supply control measures for the most
problematic commodities.  However, referendums to implement controls in wheat and turkeys
failed.  The Cotton-Wheat Act, passed in 1964, created allotments and subsidies in an effort to
reduce production in those two crops (Tweeten, 1977).  14
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 extended the wheat and grain programs to the end
of the decade.  Cotton surpluses continued to be a problem, so the 1965 Act established support
for cotton at no more than 90 percent of the world price.  Acreage diversion programs were also
enacted (Tweeten, 1977). 
The Agriculture Act of 1970 is described by Tweeten (1977) as “An act that no group
advocated, no group supported, and no one greeted with enthusiasm.  The act was opposed by all
major farm organizations, although for widely different reasons.  Neither Congress nor the
secretary of agriculture had sufficient strength to enact a partisan bill, and the result was a
compromise that ultimately became more widely accepted than any previous major program”
(p. 37).  The 1970 Act had the following new provisions:        
# to qualify for price supports, a farmer had to set-aside a specific percentage of land to 
soil conserving practices.  This contrasted with the previous allotment and marketing 
quota policies.
# payment limits were established at $55,000 per crop for upland cotton, wheat and 
feed grains (Tweeten, 1977).
In the early 1970s, a convergence of natural and political events orientated U.S.
agricultural policy toward the world market.  Weather and disease drastically reduced U.S. feed
grain production.  Additional adverse weather occurred in other grain production areas of the
world.  In 1972, the U.S. began exporting grain to the Soviet Union.  The Nixon Administration
also adopted expansionary economic policies.  As the world grain supply decreased, and the value
of the dollar fell, U.S. agricultural exports increased.  Crop prices in the United States
skyrocketed (Knutson, Penn and Flinchbaugh, 1997).  
The 1970s were unique for another reason.  It was the first time in the 20th Century,
outside of the two war periods, that concern developed about the availability of an adequate
supply of food.  With high farm prices brought on by the scarcity conditions, USDA and Congress
could change policy with relatively little scrutiny by farmers and their organizations.   During
the early 1970s, Secretary Earl Butz, a free market economist in the tradition of Secretary
Benson, set out to lower price supports.  He convinced Chairman Poage (Dem.-Tex.)  to do this
by instituting the target price program.  He also began a strategy of selling government-owned
storage facilities in the hope that it would keep USDA from getting back into the business of
commodity acquisition.  Butz considers these accomplishments as his greatest victories.  
The 1973 Act, which Secretary Butz influenced, had the following new provisions:
#  a target price program for the major grains and cotton with deficiency payments.
#  a payment limit of $20,000 per crop for deficiency payments.
# the loan rate for the major grains and cotton was reduced to at or below market price. 
# authorization of disaster payments.
# establishment of the WIC program (Hallberg, 1992).15
The early to mid-1970s became known for two other policy developments-- the instigation
of the first export embargo and the related intervention of the Department of State in farm policy
decisions.  Most importantly, since the early 1970s, farm policy began to move from the control
of farm interests (Paarlberg, 1975). 
The Yellow Dog Democrat
Since the Civil War and Reconstruction, southerners primarily had identified themselves
with the Democratic party.  The relationship originated in history, tradition and superior local
organization.  The dominance of the Democrats in the South coined a popular phrase in the
political lexicon: the yellow dog Democrat, who would vote for a yellow dog rather than vote for
a Republican.  Southern Democrats were generally more conservative and less progressive than
the Democratic party as a whole.  In the 1930s many southern Democrats joined with Republicans
in voting against New Deal programs.  During the 1950s and 1960s, many southern Democrats in
Congress voted against the civil rights legislation sponsored by the liberal northern wing of the
party. 
From 1933 to 1974, with the exception of the Republican Congresses of the late-1940s
and mid-1950s, southern Democrats dominated the leadership positions of the agricultural
committees and many key leadership positions in the Congress.  Their dominance was enabled
through the seniority system.  
Three men would control the Speaker’s gavel during this period: Sam Rayburn (Dem.-
Tex.), 1955-1961; John McCormack (Dem.-Mass.), 1962-1971; and Carl Albert (D.-Okla.),
1971-1973.  Sam Rayburn is generally recognized as being the strongest Speaker since Joseph
Cannon (Rep.-Ill., 1903-1910).  He was a man of great integrity and was well respected by his
colleagues.  The South would lose the speakership during the McCormack era.  Carl Albert’s
speakership was frustrated due to the Watergate scandal and the subsequent reform era in the
House.
From 1955 to 1974, the House Agriculture Committee had dynastic characteristics.  Two
men were chairs during this period.  Harold Cooley (Dem.-N.C.) was chair from the 84th
Congress until the 89th Congress (1955-1966).  Including his terms during the 81st and 82nd
Congresses, he was chair for a total of 18 years.  His successor and previously vice-chair, W.R.
Poage (Dem.-Tex.), was chair from the 90th through the 93rd Congresses (1967-1974).  
A survey of the opinions of House Agriculture Committee members in 1958 classified
Cooley as not being “among the strong House committee chairmen,” but being respected as “fair
and honest.”  Poage, then vice-chair, was noted as being the only vice-chair in the House at that
time.  Poage was described as being “very forceful, knowledgeable and capable.”  Cooley
willingly shared power with Poage (Jones 1961). 
   Southern Democrats controlled the committee and dominated the subcommittees.  From
1955 to 1974, from 50 to 70 percent of the majority members of the committee were southern
Democrats (Table 3).  During this period, southern Democrats held at least two-thirds of all
subcommittee chairs.  Interestingly, the first vestiges of a new trend were also beginning to
appear.  Whereas from the 84th to the 89th Congress (1955-1967), there was only one non-
majority member who was from the South; in the 90th Congress (1967-1969) there were four and
in the 92nd Congress (1971-1973) there were five Republican southerners.16
Table 3.  House Agriculture Committee Composition, 1955-1974.
Congress Number of Number of Number of Total Committee Number of Number of 
Members on the Majority Majority Members from Subcommittees Subcommittee
Committee Members Members from the South Chairs from the
the South South
84th 34 19 13 14 19 17
85th 34 19 13 14 18 17
86th 34 22 14 15 15 12
87th 35 21 14 15 14 9
88th 35 21 12 13 16 12
89th 35 24 13 14 15 10
90th 35 20 14 18 15 11
91st 34 19 13 17 10 8
92nd 36 22 12 17 10 8
93rd 36 20 10 15 14 10
Source: House Committee on Agriculture, Legislative Calendar, various editions.
Table 4.  Senate Agriculture Committee Composition, 1955-1974.
Congress Number of Number of Number of Total Committee Number of Number of 
Members on the Majority Majority Members from Subcommittees Subcommittee
Committee Members Members from the South Chairs from the
the South South
84th 15 8 6 6 5 5
85th 15 8 6 6 5 4
86th 17 11 6 6 5 4
87th 17 11 6 7 5 5
88th 17 11 8 9 5 5
89th 15 10 6 7 5 5
90th 15 10 7 7 5 5
91st 13 7 6 7 5 5
92nd 14 8 6 7 6 4
93rd 13 7 4 6 6 3
Sources: Official Congressional Directory, various editions and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Legislative
Calendar, various editions.17
In the Senate, Lyndon Johnson (Dem.-Tex.)  was the majority leader from 1955 until he
was chosen as Kennedy’s running mate in 1960.  Mike Mansfield (Dem.-Mont.) succeeded
Johnson and was majority leader until the end of the period.  Johnson would become President in
1963 when John Kennedy was assassinated.  Arguably, the South was at its high water mark in
the national political context with Rayburn as Speaker of the House and Johnson as majority
leader of the Senate (84th-86th Congresses, 1955-1960).  They were two of the most persuasive
individuals ever to hold those positions, as well as being close friends and colleagues.
There was a southern dynasty in the Senate Agriculture Committee as well.  Allen
Ellender (Dem.-Okla.) was chair of the committee from the 84th to the 90th Congress (1955-
1969).  Counting his term during the 82nd Congress (1951-1953), he was chair for a total of 16
years.  His successor was Herman Talmadge (Dem.-Ga.).  Talmadge would serve throughout the
remainder of the period.    
From 1955 to 1974, the Senate Agriculture Committee reflected less dominance of
southern Democrats than was shown in the House.  While still impressive numbers, from only 30
to 47 percent of the majority members of the Senate committee were southern Democrats (Table
4).  During this period, at their lowest point, southern Democrats controlled half of all
subcommittee chairs.  In the 84th (1955-1957) and 87th-91st Congresses (1961-1971), southern
Democrats were chairs of all five subcommittees.  As another example of a future trend, the first
non-majority member who was from the South appeared in the 87th Congress (1961-1963).  In
the 93rd Congress (1973-1975), there were two Republican southerners.         
Assessment:  1955-1974
Probably no region will ever dominate U.S. politics like the South did during this era.  In
agricultural policy, southerners dominated the leadership positions and the committees.  Yet, on
the South’s own merits, little substantive agricultural policy was produced during this time.  In the
mid-1950s, the South fought to return U.S. policy to high and fixed price supports; a battle it lost. 
During the 1960s and early-1970s, the policy proposals originated with the various
administrations.  The ultimate legislation consisted of compromises and horse trades.  
Looking back through history, this should be expected.  From a policy innovation
standpoint, the agriculture committees were the weakest node of the iron triangle consisting of the
farm organizations, USDA and the agricultural committees.  Perhaps this is because the
congresspersons on the committees had limited technical training and few staff assets.  They  Cochrane and Ryan write in 1976, “Perhaps the agricultural committees of the Congress could build a
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staff with sufficient skill and experience to draft effect legislation in the complex area of farm price and income
legislation.  But they have not.  And they could do so now only with considerable effort and at considerable
expense.  Thus, the work of developing new program ideas and incorporating those ideas into legislation has
devolved upon the research, legal, and administrative staffs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The secretary
provides the policy guidance in the form of program goals and objectives, and his technical staffs construct the
program features which can achieve those goals, or perhaps even tell the secretary that his goals are unattainable,
given certain constrains (e.g., a budget limit)” (page 107).  It is interesting to note that post-1970s, Congress did
develop the staff and the role of USDA was subsequently diminished.
  Cochrane and Ryan (1976) credit the following individuals in academia as having direct influence on
9
policy: John D. Black, 1930s and 1940s; Walter W. Wilcox, 1950s and 1960s; Willard Cochrane, late-1950s and
early 1960s; George E. Brandow, D. Gale Johnson, and John A. Schnittker, 1960s-1973;  John Kenneth Galbraith,
1940-1965 (p.  119).
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lacked the resources and expertise of the USDA specialists  and university professors  who
8 9
originated the policies and the farm organizations which advocated them.
It is still disappointing that from 1933 to 1974, the South left a legacy of power on the
agriculture committees, but not greatness.  Of the members of the House and Senate agricultural
committees who served during this era and went on to achieve distinction in congressional
leadership or ran as a presidential candidate (Carl Albert, Tom Foley, Hubert Humphrey, George
McGovern, Walter Mondale and Bob Dole) or become secretary of agriculture (Bob Bergland
and Edward Madagan) only one, Carl Albert, was from the South.
If there is a legacy for the southern Democrats, it is the agricultural transformation of the
South from a three crop system to diversified agriculture.  Government price and income
supporting policies allowed farmers to increase the size of their operations and/or diversify.  This
occurred while the twin forces of mechanization and yield-increasing technologies allowed a
sustained increase in agricultural output in the United States and the South.     
The Turnover:  1975-1993
Empire Lost
This paper has supported the standard thesis that the South’s political power was based on
its ability to consistently elect congresspersons of one party who were then able to acquire power
through the seniority system.  It should be expected that if either the seniority system or the
electorial system in the South were threatened, the South would correspondingly lose.  We
present the following evidence to support this assertion:
# Voting Rights Reform.  Until reform was brought about by 1960s Supreme Court
decisions upholding the “one-person-one-vote” principle, malapportionment was
common in the South.  Many rural conservative white areas were over represented
(Rieselbach, 1995).     
# 1970s Congressional Reforms.  Northern liberal and progressive Democrats were
increasingly dissatisfied by the seniority system and its ability to allow the dominance19
of Congress by elderly, conservative southerners.  This agitation was especially
apparent during the civil rights legislation and Vietnam debates during the 1960s.  In
the early 1970s, reforms were enacted to discontinue the seniority system in the
selection of committee chairpersons and to decentralize power in committees. 
Subcommittees and their chairmen were given much greater power.  This reform
movement became most visible when a whole cadre of reform-minded
congresspersons were elected in the 1974 post-Watergate mid-term elections.  The
new wave precipitated the removal of the southern old guard.  In 1975, three
Committee chairmen were ousted and replaced by more junior members.  One of those
chairmen was W.R. Poage (Dem.-Tex.) of the House Agriculture Committee (Cohn,
1991).  
# Increase in the Number of Noncompetitive Seats in the North.  Wolfinger and 
Heifeitz investigated the southern control issue in 1965.  They concluded that 
northern and southern safe-seat Democratic congresspersons had the same level of 
seniority, and there were no differences between the views of the electorate
concerning congressional service.  Southern dominance in the mid-1960s was a
reflection of the 1946 congressional election in which many liberal northerners were
defeated.  Wolfinger and Heifeitz concluded that northern democrats would become
much more influential [post-1965] as they were not any less likely to accrue seniority
than southern Democrats.  Furthermore, the number of noncompetitive seats in the
north was increasing.  
# Rise of a Conservative Republican Party in the South.  As a general characteristic, 
the southern Democrat has been more conservative and less progressive and unlikely 
to identify with the liberal wing of the party.  The first obvious crack in the one-party 
Democratic South was the 1964 election where Barry Goldwater won five southern 
states.  In the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, twelve southern states chose a 
California Republican over a Georgia Democrat.  Reagan’s coat-tails permitted the 
election of many Republicans in the South.  By 1985, half of the Senators and 43 of 
the 116 House members of the Old Confederacy were Republicans.  
It would take twenty years for the southern Democrats to go from the highest peak of
power on the Agriculture Committees to the lowest valley.  The first defeat was the replacement
of Chairman Poage (Dem.-Tex.) of the House Agriculture Committee with Tom Foley (Dem.-
Wash.) in 1974.  For 39 years during the period 1931-1974, a southern Democrat had control of
the gavel, a control only relinquished during the two Republican Congresses in the late-1940s and
mid-1950s.    
The next stroke was the coat-tail effects of the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.  The
1980 elections in the House and the 1980 and 1982 elections in the Senate had an immense impact
on southern Democrat representation on the Agriculture Committees (Tables 5 and 6).  The
number of southern Democrats on the Agricultural Committees declined by one-fourth in the
House and by one-half in the Senate.           20
Table 5.  House Agriculture Committee Composition, 1975-1997.
Congress Number of Number of Number of Total Committee Number of Number of 
Members on the Majority Majority Members from Subcommittees Subcommittee
Committee Members Members from the South Chairs from the
the South South
94th 41 27 12 15 10 7
95th 46 31 15 18 10 7
96th 41 27 12 14 10 6
97th 43 22 9 11 8 3
98th 41 26 12 13 10 5
99th 43 26 14 16 11 7
100th 41 25 11 15 10 6
101st 43 27 14 18 9 6
102nd 45 27 12 15 8 6
103rd 50 29 13 22 7 4
104th 49 27 10 18 5 0
105th 50 27 12 23 5 2
Source: House Committee on Agriculture, Legislative Calendar, various editions.
Note: Republican-majority congresses are shaded.
Table 6.  Senate Agriculture Committee Composition, 1975-1997.
Congress Number of Number of Number of Total Committee Number of Number of 
Members on the Majority Majority Members from Subcommittees Subcommittee
Committee Members Members from the South Chairs from the
the South South
94th 14 9 5 7 6 3
95th 18 11 6 8 7 3
96th 18 10 6 8 7 3
97th 17 9 3 7 8 2
98th 18 10 3 7 7 2
99th 17 9 4 7 6 2
100th 19 10 5 8 7 4
101st 19 10 4 7 7 4
102nd 17 10 4 7 7 4
103rd 18 10 4 7 6 3
104th 18 10 6 8 4 3
105th 18 10 5 6 4 2
Sources: Official Congressional Directory, various editions and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Legislative
Calendar, various editions.
Note: Republican-majority congresses are shaded  One of the authors, Knutson, was a staff economist and later, agency administrator, in USDA during
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the early 1970s.  He notes the realization by Secretary Butz (Nixon Administration) that if he sent a bill to the Hill,
it would be picked apart by a Democratic Congress.  The beginning of the policy transition from USDA to the
agriculture committees can be traced to the early 1970s.   
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When the Republicans gained control of the Senate in the 97th Congress (1981-1983), the
gavel of the Senate committee passed from Herman Talmadge (Dem.-Ga.) to Jesse Helms (Rep.-
N.C.).  Talmadge had been chair for ten years.  When the Democrats regained control of the
Senate in the 100th Congress (1987-1989), the Agriculture Committee gavel passed to Patrick
Leahy (Dem.-Vt.).  Another era was over.  
In the 97th Congress (1981-1983), the South regained the chair of the House Agriculture
Committee when Tom Foley (Dem.-Wash.) became majority whip.  Kika de la Garza (Dem.-Tex.)
would be chair until the 1994 elections, when the Republicans would gain control of Congress. 
Many of those defeated were southern Democrats.
Regardless, the subsequent farm bills, particularly the 1981, 1985 and 1990 Acts, were
written in a different political environment.  With the dethroning of the southern chairmen and the
political reforms of the 1970s, the agriculture committees, particularly the subcommittees,
acquired more power, albeit decentralized.  With more power, subcommittees acquired more staff
and took an active interest in writing the actual provisions of the legislation.   Arguably, some
10
subcommittee chairmen during this era were more powerful than the chairmen of twenty and
thirty years before.  Congress in this era became the primary node in the iron triangle for policy
formulation.  
The final blow to the South would be the replacement of Jamie Whitten (Dem.-Miss.) as
chair of the House Appropriations Committee.  Congressman Whitten served for 53 years, longer
than any other member of Congress in history.  One of agriculture’s best friends in Washington,
he was often referred to as the “Permanent Secretary of Agriculture.”  In 1949, he became chair
of the important Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee, a position he would hold for 44 years
(H. Carl Andersen Rep.-Minn. was chair of the subcommittee during the Republican 83rd
Congress).  From the 96th through the 102nd Congresses (1979-1992), he was chair of the full
Appropriations Committee.  After suffering a small stroke in 1992, he was quietly replaced by the
Democratic leadership.  As a measure of his importance in the agricultural policy process, the
Administration Building of USDA in Washington, D.C. was named in his honor in 1995.
Politicizing Policy
Throughout the 1980s, agricultural policy became increasingly politicized between
Republican administrations and Democratic congresses.  This was an outgrowth of a general
debate in society on the proper role of government (Duffy, 1997).  
The election of the free-market-oriented Reagan Administration occurred after most of the
compromises leading to the 1981 Act had already been made.  Consequently, a Republican-led
USDA was charged with implementing generous subsidies in the 1981 Act, which also
precipitated an unprecedented accumulation of commodity stocks.  In the face of declining
exports, storing and reducing those stocks through programs such as Payment-in-Kind, increased  Many interesting historical USDA data sets doubtlessly exist in storage or in out-of-print publications. 
11
As long-time staff members retire and the institutional memory is lost, so is part of our history.       
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program costs to record levels.  Agricultural policy was forced to the forefront of the federal
budget debate (Cochrane and Runge, 1992).
Calls by the Reagan Administration for a complete phase-out of government subsidies
were muted by the financial crisis in the agricultural sector of the mid-1980s.  Regardless, the
focus of the 1985 Act was on reducing supply and increasing export competitiveness.  While
retaining the traditional mechanism of the target price and loan rate, it reintroduced land
retirement programs from the 1950s (albeit under different names), created export-enhancement
programs, introduced the marketing loan and paid dairy producers to slaughter entire dairy herds
(Cochrane and Runge, 1992).
While budgetary issues were front and center during its formative stages, traditional
agricultural policy survived in the 1990 Act.  The 1990 Act would be the swan song of the
agricultural establishment.  
Payments to Producers
It has sometimes been assumed that the South used its power and influence on the
agricultural committees to benefit southern producers, while forsaking other areas of the country. 
During the 1930s, when there were only six program crops, it might be argued that this was the
case.  The early program crops were very southern and midwestern in orientation.  One must
consider that before the federal irrigation projects of the 1930s and the development of efficient
groundwater irrigation technology, much of the Great Plains and the West were not viable
production areas.  Regardless, agricultural legislation has since been written to address virtually
every crop.
It can be argued that through tweaking the programs, perhaps southern farmers “got more
than their fair share.”  Cochrane and Ryan (1976) note that due to southern seniority, “...the
problems of cotton, tobacco, and peanuts have received solicitous attention” (p. 114).  It is also
noted that wheat, feedgrains, sugar and dairy products had their champions as well.  In essence,
the interests of all program commodities were looked after (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976). 
Although payment data has been collected by USDA since the 1930s, a continuous series
of payments to producers by state and by program could only be acquired for 1966 to 1996.  
11
Out of this data set, the 13 southern states were aggregated.  It is noted that the South received
an average 30 percent of the government agricultural payments to producers during this period
(Figure 1).  However, there appears to be a declining trend for the South over the period.  It is
interesting to note the extremely high percentage, 62 percent, was in 1977; a period of relatively
low payments to producers (Figure 2).  Clearly, the spike in producer payments that occurred in
1993 benefitted the South, while the 1989 spike was fairly insignificant.
The makeup of agricultural payments to producers has changed over time (Figure 3).  The
majority of the payments have been in the form of producer subsidy payments from either
deficiency payments, marketing loan benefits or storage payments.  Over time, disaster and
conservation payments to producers have become more significant.  Focusing on the South,
producer subsidy payments are the dominant payment to producers (Figure 4).  The majorSource:  FSA/USDA




















































































































































































































































































Figure 2.  Government Agricultural Payments to Producers, Total U.S. and to the South, 1966-1996
23Source:  FSA/USDA




































































































































































































































































































































 programs have been cotton and rice.  As with the nation as a whole, southern producers have
received disaster payments over the last decade. 
Perhaps southern control of the agriculture committees was akin to a “home team
advantage,” something which can be surmised, but not fully measured.  Producer payment data,
which covers a significant period of southern dominance and increased government involvement
in agriculture, indicates that the South did not use its political advantage to garner government
payments while neglecting other areas of the country.     
The New South: 1994-
In the mid-1980s, a small, but vocal corps of Republican congresspersons led by Newt
Gingrich (Rep.-Ga.) began challenging the Democratic leadership. The Democratic party had been
in majority in the House since 1955 and the Republican leadership in Congress had seen itself as
an obliging minority.  In this environment, Congressman Gingrich increasingly polarized politics
between a conservative, mainly Republican wing, who advocated budgetary responsibility and a
liberal, mainly Democratic wing who favored high levels of government intervention in the private
sector.      
In 1994, Newt Gingrich orchestrated a landslide electorial toppling of the Democratic
majority in the House which carried over to the Senate.  With the defeat of many old-line liberal
Democrats and the interjection of a corps of freshmen Republicans who owed their victory to
their leader, Newt Gingrich, conditions were ripe for change.  Gingrich became one of the
strongest Speakers in decades.  Richard Armey (Rep.-Tex.), a vocal critic of agricultural
subsidies, became majority leader.  With the Republican majorities emphasis on reducing the
federal budget and reorganizing House operations, the new agricultural legislation due in 1995
would not be business as usual.        
Pat Roberts (Rep.-Kans.) assumed the chair of the House committee in the 104th
Congress.  He was able to avert an elimination of the House Agriculture Committee by agreeing
to place agricultural programs on the fiscal chopping block.  With higher than average commodity
prices, the emphasis on budgetary reductions, and with many of the major players (Majority
Leader Dole, Chairman Roberts, Secretary Glickman) from the same state, Kansas, an
environment existed for the reform of agricultural policy.  Richard Lugar (Rep.-Ind.), chair of the
Senate Agriculture Committee, began the process by suggesting it was time to eliminate
commodity programs (Knutson, Penn and Flinchbaugh, 1997).  
The proposal by Chairman Roberts which ultimately emerged as the 1996 farm bill,
Freedom to Farm, was a watershed change in policy.  The target price program was eliminated
and replaced with declining seven-year fixed transition payments.  Virtual full planting flexibility
replaced acreage reduction authority and commodity acreage bases were eliminated.  The 1996
farm bill lacked virtually any resemblance to the 1990 Act (Knutson, Penn and Flinchbaugh,
1997).  
Southern Control: Prospects for the Future
In certain regions of the South, distasteful bumper stickers can be found which say “the
South will rise again.”  In a political sense, in many ways the South has risen again.  What is most
surprising is that the South’s rise was facilitated through the Republican party.  In the current  In Knutson, Penn and Flinchbaugh (1997) it is noted that “Since the 1992 elections, a trend can be
12
noted of increased dissatisfaction by members with the institution of Congress (members not seeking reelection)
and increased accountability at the polls (incumbents being defeated).  In the 1992 elections, 110 house seats and
11 senate seats changed hands.  In the 1994 elections, 87 house seats and 9 senate seats changed hands.  In the
1996 elections, 74 house seats and 15 senate seats changed hands.  Consequently, in 1997, 16 of the 50 members of
the House Agriculture Committee were freshmen and 38 had begun their service since 1992.  Only 5 members
were present when the previous farm bill was debated and passed in 1989.  Only two members of the minority and
not a single member of the majority were present when President Carter imposed the most recent embargo on
agricultural exports in 1980" (p.  46).
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political climate, in a Democratic majority, the South would be far less represented in the
leadership positions. 
In the 105th Congress, with a Republican majority, southerners hold the top leadership
positions.  Newt Gingrich (Rep.-Ga.) is Speaker of the House.  Richard Armey (Rep.-Tex.) is
House majority leader.  Tom Delay (Rep.-Tex.) is majority whip.  The Democrats’ leadership lies
with the Midwest:  Richard Gephardt (Dem.-Mo.), minority leader and David Bonior (Dem.-
Mich.) minority whip.  Interestingly, southern leadership with the Republicans does not have the
breadth of the southern Democrats of twenty-five years before.  Of the twenty full committees in
the House, southerners are chairmen of only five.  
Southerners likewise are dominant in the Republican Senate leadership:  Strom Thurmond
(Rep.-S.C). is president pro tempore, Trent Lott (Rep.-Miss.) is majority leader, Don Nickles
(Rep.-Okla.) is majority whip.  The Democratic minority leader is Tom Daschle (Dem.-N.D.) and
the minority whip is Wendell Ford (Dem.-Ky.).  While southerners are well represented in the
leadership positions, only five of the twenty full committee chairmen are southerners.   
  While the South has regained considerable political power in the leadership of the House
and Senate, it holds the chair of neither the House nor Senate Agriculture Committees. 
Southerners do hold two of the five subcommittee chairs in the House and two of the four
subcommittee chairs in the Senate (Tables 5 and 6).  Not to be overlooked is Thad Cochrane
(Rep.-Miss.) who is chair of the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee and third-
ranking member on the Senate Agriculture Committee.  The team of Lott, Nickles and Cochrane
represent a formidable force to those who might desire to dismantle the cotton, rice, peanuts and
sugar programs.    
Presently, there are more southern Republicans than southern Democrats in both
committees.  It terms of total southerners as a percentage of total committee members, the South
is in as strong a position today as it was thirty years ago (Figures 5 and 6).  Figures 5 and 6 also
chart the rise and fall of the southern Democrat.  In terms of the percentage of total membership
on the committees, the southern Democrat is an endangered species.  With the increased
polarization in the political parties, the southern conservative Democrat is even more of a rarity.
With a Republican or even a Democratic majority, the prospects for southerners returning
to the same type of dominance as in the past are not very favorable.  The rise of a two-party
system and reapportionment in the South means that many more elections are contested today. 
The seniority system, which was the primary path to power for southerners, has been revised. 
Larry Combest (Rep.-Tex.) lost the chair of the House Agriculture Committee for voting against
the freedom to farm provisions of the 1996 farm bill.  There is also an increased degree of
turnover in Congress as members choose not to run for reelection or are defeated.   







Southern Democrats Total Southerners
Figure 5.  Percentage Total Members of the House Agriculture Committee from the South, 1927-1997








Southern Democrats Total Southerners
Figure 6.  Percentage Total Members of the Senate Agriculture Committee from the South, 1927-1997
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Additionally, while the South still has large rural areas, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to define the South as an agrarian region.  With each new census, rural votes are being diminished
by urbanization.  There are fewer and fewer truly agricultural districts in the South.  In 1986,
using late-1970s data, Green and Carlin identified 46 farming-orientated congressional districts in
the United States.  They defined a farming-orientated district as where a third or more of its
counties are farming-dependent (one-fifth or more of its earned income).  Only sixteen of the 46
districts were in the southern states defined by our study.     
Membership of the now defunct House Rural Caucus was once a measure of which
districts had a strong rural/agricultural interest.  In the last membership list from the 104th
Congress, of the 52 members, 16 were from the South.  Presently, there are 137 congressional
districts in the 13 southern states defined by this study.  It follows then, that, perhaps less than 12
percent of the congressional districts in the South are truly agricultural.    
The South has risen again, but Marvin Jones and Ellison Smith would not recognize it. 
The mule has been replaced by 360 horsepower tractors using satellites to precision farm the land. 
Sharecropping is no longer practiced.  Cotton has moved west and cropping has diversified. 
Republican southerners outnumber Democrats on the agriculture committees.  The survival of the
agriculture committees themselves is not a certainty.  The empire which they started has ended. 
Perhaps a new empire is beginning.  
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